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ABSTRACT: This paper examines Andrei Sakharov's dissident protests against the Soviet regime as
arguments to a non-cooperating interlocutor. Approaching the 1970s-1980s Soviet dissident public sphere
as a Toulminian ‘field’ of argumentation, I infer a field-dependent function of Sakharov's argument from an
analysis of its structure and implicit assessment criteria. Besides justification, the function of Sakharov’s
argument is performative: he argues for political action by demonstrating a model of practical reasoning
that raises private consciousness to the level of public agency. By exposing his own political rationality as a
‘live’ mode of proof for the speculative ‘truth’ of his conviction, Sakharov suggests a connection between
theoretical thinking and action.
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In The Uses of Argument, Stephen Toulmin introduces the concept of function to define
‘argument’ in field-invariant terms, as a discursive act of the justification of a thesis
(2003, p.12). The ‘primary’ function of justification determines the structure of argument
on the most general level, formalized as a procedural model based on the judicial process
(Toulmin, 2003, pp.16-21). Toulmin derives his notion of field-dependence from this
generic judicial-justificatory model: what distinguishes arguments within different fields
is different ‘logical types’ of assertions, those of facts to support assertions, and those of
transitions between facts and assertions—all serving the common goal of justification
(2003, pp.13-14). For Toulmin, the notion of function precedes that of the field largely
because identifying a function of argument is unproblematic, the purpose of arguing
being transparent to the arguers in the context of the interaction and to the analyst
interpreting the encounter. In a number of fields with well-established rhetorical practices
this may very well be the case. However, when applied to the ambiguities of
argumentation in the public sphere the question of function becomes a difficult one. As I
will show in this paper, it is not always clear what functions public arguments perform,
why they are put forth, and why they are structured one way rather than another. Here
Toulmin’s theory allows us to formulate a set of important questions: What is ‘function’
in public argumentation? What functional features of argument are field-dependent? If,
upon Toulmin’s definition, the field is comprised of arguments of the same ‘logical type’
appealing to the same criteria of assessment, what kind of field(s) is the public sphere?
How does the field determine the structure of reasoning in public argumentation?
This paper argues that the question of argument function in the public sphere
should be kept open as a productive approach to the study of real-life argumentative
events. Beyond theorizing broad taxonomies of ‘the uses of argument’, we can enrich our
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understanding of how public arguments function through a bottom-up, empirical analysis
of concrete argumentative practices in specific historical-political contexts.
As a sample of such analysis, I concentrate on political argument in an equivocal
functional setting, when arguing is by all practical standards supposed to fail. I turn to the
work of the Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, who in the heyday of the Soviet empire
produced a number of public statements against the regime, including open letters to the
Soviet authorities. Such situations exceed the definition of argument implicit in the work
of Toulmin and many other argument theorists, who predicate argument on the
precondition that both sides to the interaction be willing to engage in rational debate (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren et al., 1993; Blair and Johnson, 1987;
Johnson, 2000; Willard, 1982, 1989; Walton, 1989; Walton and Krabbe, 1995). In this
study, I address three questions: (1) What rhetorical function does Sakharov’s argument
perform, and how? (2) How is his argument structured? (3) Given the fragmentary,
emerging status of the Soviet dissident protests in the 1970s-1980s as a ‘field’ or
rhetorical practice, what assessment criteria can be inferred from Sakharov’s appeals?
For the purposes of text analysis, I use the term ‘argument’ to designate a
sustained effort at explicit reason giving, when the author intends his pattern of inference
to be sufficiently manifest.1 Given loose genre conventions of public discourse, Sakharov
is a remarkably rigorous arguer in this sense. He not only advances claims, clearly framed
as such—be they specific suggestions for action, thought, or policy making—but also
systematically adduces support for them. I focus on Sakharov’s work of the late 1970searly 1980s, most written during his exile in Gorky (1980-1986). By this time, he is a
Nobel peace Prize winner (1975), with a solid reputation in the international human rights
movement. At home, Sakharov’s career is less straightforward. He starts off as ‘a pillar of
the Soviet Establishment’, one of the inventors of the hydrogen bomb, but, having faced
the destructive potential of his own scientific endeavors, he turns to political struggle
against the regime (Friendly, 1978). In Sakharov’s life and in the late Soviet history as a
whole, the stagnation of the 1970s-early 1980s stands out as a period of political
repressions, the military intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989), escalating international
hostility, and mass dejection and indifference in Soviet society. Sakharov’s public
statements of the period include appeals to specific officials and a wider publicity in the
USSR and the West, in which he mounts an attack against totalitarianism (Babyonyshev,
1982, pp. xxvi-xxix). Focusing on the argumentative means by which he does so, I
approach all of his statements of the period as arguments to a non-cooperating majority.
Many Soviet dissidents of the time find attacking the system headlong, through rational
argument, futile; instead, they opt for literary and other non-argumentative forms of
expression as a vehicle for political ideas (Shatz, 1980, pp. 140-144). Unlike those,
Sakharov chooses argument, despite repeated criticisms of naiveté from Soviet politicians
and intelligentsia (Sakharov, 1978, ‘Afterword’, pp.169-170; Friendly, 1978, pp. viii-xv).
Why he insists on argument, what he achieves by it, and whether he is really naive I
discuss further in this paper.

1

My definition of argument is influenced by Ralph Johnson’s theory of ‘manifest rationality’, which
demands that arguers commit themselves to the public display of reason giving (2000, pp. 161-163). I do
not directly rely on other parts of his normative conception.
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In my approach to the questions of function, structure, and assessment criteria, I
proceed inductively. I reverse Toulmin’s conceptual hierarchy and start at the bottom
level, with the analysis of structure—of the specific inference patterns at work in
Sakharov’s original texts on the micro and macro level. I focus on Sakharov’s five major
public statements of the period: ‘Alarm and Hope’, 1977; ‘Open Letter to Anatoly
Alexandrov, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences’, 1980; ‘An Alarming Time’,
1980; ‘Open Letter to Brezhnev’, 1980; and ‘The Responsibility of Scientists’, 1981.
Here, my goal is to define the ‘logical type’ of his argument, i.e., to conclude what kind
of assertions, support, and logical transitions he employs to build his case. I discuss my
method of argument reconstruction and my conclusions in Section 1. In Section 2, I
extend my analysis of argument structure to include some considerations of assessment
criteria, as they inform argument design. I focus on one specific line of justification,
typical of Sakharov’s protests, that thematizes reasons for the arguer’s right of public, as
opposed to private, voice. From a broader assessment criteria perspective, I approach
Sakharov’s argument as an architectonic that comprises several levels of validity
justification, from which I infer his model of practical reasoning. On the basis of my
analysis, in Section 3 I finally concentrate on the question of function. I attempt to
explain why of all available resources of persuasion Sakharov chooses to emphasize
reasoning in his public statements.
1. ARGUMENT STRUCTURE
To unravel the structural complexities and ambiguities of the text, I adopt a two-step
method of argument reconstruction. First, I identify the framework of structural relations
among discursive units by using Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) by Mann,
Matthiessen, and Thompson (1989). RST is a method of text analysis that allows me to
parse the text along the lines of functional distinctions among its components (which
express, among the most recurrent ones, the relations of motivation, evidence,
concession, background, circumstance, solutionhood, elaboration, purpose, result, means,
sequence, contrast, joint, etc.) and reconstruct them as propositions (Mann et al., 1989). I
start on the level of clauses and sentences, and proceed to the level of paragraphs and
larger stretches of discourse, diagramming each of the five texts as a complex system of
propositions on the micro and macro level. Second, I examine the RST scheme of
structural relationships to identify the main trajectories of claim-and-support at work in
the texts. I see when and how the Toulmin model applies, as well as what other argument
configurations emerge from my mapping of the discourse structure. At this stage, I
identify grounds in support of more local claims, as well as the relationship among the
latter, which also tends to assume a hierarchical claim-support structure, building towards
one culminating thesis.
As an interpretive tool of text analysis, the Toulmin model applies to Sakharov’s
argument, with a few qualifications. In the narrow sense of ‘physiological’ micro
inference, from factual evidence to claims about the world, the data-claim-warrant pattern
explicitly figures at limited junctures of the text, without backing or rebuttal. In fact,
‘factual evidence’ often takes the form of descriptive, generalizing references to the
experiential reality, imbued with evaluation—judgments, rather than ‘hard facts’.
Ostensibly, Sakharov’s argument is speculative: he delivers a sort of theory of
totalitarianism, which arises from his reflection on his experience of living in the Soviet
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Union. Yet it would be a mistake to say that his reasoning is removed from reality. His
choice and presentation of data reveal certain strategic preferences, with an important role
in argument structure.
On a larger, ‘anatomical’ scale of Sakharov’s reasoning, the tripartite model of
data-claim-warrant can well capture the properties of the deliberative ‘practical inference’
that I find characteristic of his reasoning style (Walton, 1990). What Sakharov finally
wants his reader to do is not just reason along, but act—to engage in some kind of
political activism against totalitarian regimes. For the West, Sakharov demands that it
joins the struggle for civil rights all around the world (‘Alarm and Hope’); for the Soviet
leaders, that they stop expansionism abroad and repressions at home (‘Open Letter to
Brezhnev’); for Soviet citizens, that they rise against the regime by joining the dissidents,
at the cost of political persecution (‘An Alarming Time’). As a general pattern, Sakharov
argues from experience (data) to normative claims about policy and moral behavior by
thematizing logical transitions between the two (warrants), which tend to assume a
complex logical architecture of their own. Although Sakharov’s are by no means warrantestablishing arguments in Ryle’s sense (Toulmin, 2003, p. 112), he always elaborates on
warrants, as a distinct focus in his argument structure. Below, I will briefly discuss the
architecture of his argument, with close attention to the warranting mechanism.
Sakharov’s argument unfolds on two levels, giving reasons in support of two
kinds of claims—those that define problems and those that offer solutions. The lower
level, problem-defining, claims concern no less than the comprehensive ‘tragic problems
of the modern world’, which Sakharov diligently diagnoses and contemplates (1978,
‘Alarm’, p. 99). He grounds his diagnoses in four kinds of data: (1) historical events (e.g.,
the 1968 Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, the assassination of Kirov, etc.); (2) expert
technical and broad political knowledge (e.g., facts about nuclear energy, weapons,
environment, the contemporary political scene, etc.); (3) specific information about
today’s victims of political repressions in the USSR (names, prison sentences, personal
qualifications, etc.); (4) descriptive references to the common experience of living in the
Soviet Union (e.g., snippets of everyday Soviet parlance, like ‘No use banging your head
against the wall’) (1978, ‘Alarm’, p. 101). Sakharov accords different status to different
kinds of data. Some he presents cursively, as background information (1 and 2); some he
amplifies, aiming at increased presence (3 and 4). Functionally, the data portraying the
stark realities of totalitarianism (3and 4) play a special part in the global argument
structure. Besides supporting problem-defining claims in the narrow sense of ‘hard
evidence’, his factual testimony also, however indirectly, reinforces the transition
between problem-defining and higher-order solution-claims of moral obligation. Here the
shift from ‘what is’ to ‘what should be’ depends on the deontological assumption that
human beings ought to oppose injustice, whenever they encounter it; the more they are
aware of injustice, the more reason they have to resist. As far as warrants on the databased level of inference are concerned, Sakharov leaves them tacit. Yet in the overall
structure of his argument, he does not at all trust the self-evidence of moral appeals.
When connecting problem-defining claims to solution-claims on the second tier of
argument, Sakharov develops elaborate sets of reasons for why his reader should act
justly or morally. Such transitions involve multiple value assumptions of a teleological
and deontological nature (Ricoeur, 1992), but the weight of the actual proof falls on nonmoral reasoning. Below, I focus on the role of deontological values—propositions of
moral obligation, involving ‘the ought’—in the warranting architecture of Sakharov’s
arguments, designating them ‘moral’ values (in my reconstruction of values as

A REASON FOR REASONING?

417

propositions, I follow Sillars and Ganer, 1982). Across the examined texts, his recurrent
moral imperatives include the values of equity, humanity, integrity, freedom, individual
responsibility, and compassion. In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s terms, they function
as ‘absolute values’ (1969, pp.77-79), yet Sakharov does not present them as discrete,
self-sufficient reasons for his conclusions.
Moral propositions recur in two components of Sakharov’s argument structure: in
culminating solution-claims, where they find direct discursive expression (e.g.,
‘Lawlessness and infringements of human rights cannot be tolerated on this planet’; 1978,
‘Alarm’, p.111), and as an implicit part of the complex warrant that links declarative
statements about the present to final appeals to action. As a general tendency, Sakharov
carefully reinforces deontological warrants by different ‘instrumental’ kinds of reasoning,
i.e., embeds them in explicit pragmatic considerations. Upon the resultant impression,
ethical imperatives are not superimposed, but, as it were, emerge from non-moral
practical reasoning about the common good.
To illustrate the point, I will focus on ‘Alarm and Hope’, a 1977 essay Sakharov
writes at the request of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee. The piece is organized as
a gradation of ends-means arguments for a solution to the overarching problem of the
threat of nuclear war. First, Sakharov stipulates that in order to escape the danger of
mutual destruction, the socialist and the capitalist political systems must ‘converge’.
Within this scenario, he suggests increasingly more specific means to achieve the ends,
until he reaches the culminating deontic solution-claim: it is the West that ‘ought to’ take
the onus for convergence, by assuming a pro-active position in disarmament negotiations
and the defense of human rights in the totalitarian countries (1991, p. 105). Between the
top problem and the bottom solution, Sakharov lays out a complex warranting mechanism
with the following reasons: the West ought to actively fight totalitarianism (1) because it
is the only agent capable of progressive change; if it does not promote convergence,
nobody else will (Sakharov develops a mini-treatise on the nature of totalitarianism to
support this point); (2) because it can, having the appropriate means at its disposal, such
as its potential for internal transformation due to the principle of pluralism (here
Sakharov gives his reasoned assessment of Western democracy); (3) because it has to if it
wants to avoid the destruction of civilization. Besides, (4) a purely deontological ‘ought’
remains an implicit part of the warrant: the West ought to fight totalitarianism simply
because it is an unqualifiedly right thing, dictated by ‘absolute’ moral imperatives.
Judging by the sheer bulk of discursive expression, non-moral components of
Sakharov’s reasoning far outweigh references to ‘the ought’. The latter surface at the far
end of rational justification, accompanied by a cluster of circumstantial ends-means
expositions of how world events happen. Sakharov thereby inscribes absolute moral
values in the logic of historical necessity. He concomitantly lends public status to
morality. By embedding deontological warrants in matters of political causality, he shows
that the dictates of individual conscience are in internal harmony with the structure of
public reality, that one’s innermost moral values of justice, freedom, human dignity, etc.,
are validated by the very force of historical development. His appeals to action, then,
depend on his reader’s realization of her belonging in transcendental contexts of the large
historical-political reality, which makes certain demands on the individual. Importantly,
this realization is achieved not through any act of non-rational identification with the
values, but through careful reasoning about the world.
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2. CRITERIA OF ASSESSMENT
Sakharov’s position—a system of cognitive propositions about the world, which play the
role of claims in his argument structure—receives two types of support. On my reading,
each text builds towards one culminating claim, which, in the spirit of the practical
syllogistic, I interpret as a call to political action. Sakharov adduces one body of reasons
to justify why such actions are meaningful by virtue of historical necessity that he
constructs through his use of logical inference and data. These reasons unfold in the bulk
of his argument; I discuss them above in Section 1. Sakharov’s argument features another
body of reasons to justify the validity of his position on a different front—not only as a
sensible and internally coherent account, but also as a legitimate public statement.
The question of what makes discourse public, as opposed to private, has
significance for both contemporary rhetorical theory and argumentation studies. In
rhetoric, it affects the very definition of its disciplinary identity as ‘a theory of public
discourse’, as well as conceptions of political deliberation (Bitzer, 1978; Kaufer and
Butler, 1996; Asen, 2004). In argumentation theory, the question of public entitlement
falls under the problematic of assessment criteria. Here, I approach Sakharov’s reasons
for his right of public voice as a field-dependent mode of claiming validity for his
argument, with implications for theories of deliberative rationality.
As a claim to validity, Sakharov’s defense of his public entitlement reflects the
conditions of the 1970s-1980s Soviet dissident public sphere: he gives more prominence
to his self-authorization in those addresses where he anticipates the biggest skepticism—
to the Soviet authorities and to the Soviet citizens, who would jeopardize their lives and
careers by following his ‘heroic’ prescriptions.
Sakharov’s public entitlement arguments are interspersed through the texts and
take a different place in the argument structure of each. In no particular order, the major
reasons in support of Sakharov’s right for public discourse include: (1) his civic right to
freedom of speech and freedom of conscience as a citizen of his country; (2) his
international visibility as a Nobel Prize winner; (3) his empathy and indignation, as a
human being endowed with a sense of morality, which he holds universal, in the face of
human rights violations in the USSR; (4) the gravity of the modern problems, which
urgently demand solutions, whoever can contribute to them—i.e., his creative capacities
as a thinker and problem-solver; (5) his speaking on behalf of at least two groups of
individuals, with whom he has been working over extended periods of time—Soviet
nuclear scientists and human rights advocates; (6) in a somewhat less straightforward
fashion, Sakharov claims the supra-subjective status of his position as a product of
rigorous reasoned reflection, his subjective vision of the world ‘objectified’ by the power
of rationality. To support this point, Sakharov stresses that his position developed at the
expense of the break of continuity with his earlier views and convictions (1991, p. 185).
In parallel to the grounding of moral warrants in historical causes discussed in
Section 1, Sakharov’s reasons for public entitlement provide a bridge from private to
public consciousness. Here, it is not an abstract individual subjectivity but his own
authorial ‘I’ that stands at the nexus of the particular and the universal. Through reasongiving in support of his public authority, he transforms the individual as a seat of reason
and values into a public agent who draws on the private, deeply personal resources of
reason and values to promote the common good. On the one hand, Sakharov does not
eliminate his personal voice from his writing. He speaks from feeling, in a personalized,
non-clichéd, and at times even poetic style, in jarring contrast to the Soviet officialese.
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On the other hand, he minimizes descriptive references to himself as a private person. He
directly speaks of himself only to justify why his position matters—where it originates
and how it represents other people. For example, in ‘The Responsibility of Scientists’, he
mentions repressions against himself and his family at the end of the long list of other
victims of the regime, as a particular case in the general practice. Nowhere in the piece
does he explicitly claim his entitlement to advise scientists on moral issues by virtue of
also being a scientist, speaking from above the moral ideals that he happens to embrace
while others fail. As the vectors of claim-support in his texts indicate, his first-hand
experience only entitles him to a public voice from below: it equips him with an expertise
in moral decision making, empathy, and a certain kind of political thinking—along with
others, on behalf of whom he chooses to speak.
The concept of assessment criteria can yet be applied to Sakharov’s argument in a
broader sense—as a tactical orientation of his text design on the level of invention
(Kaufer and Butler, 1996). As long as we assume that he structures his argument in
anticipation of certain validity expectations, we can look at his reasoning pattern as preemptive defense on a few fronts. To put it more neutrally, Sakharov aims at a match
between his own moves and his audience’s criteria of what counts as reasonable and
worthy in public political discourse. Sakharov gears his argument for evaluation along the
following assessment criteria: (1) what gives him the right of a public voice: selfauthorization arguments; (2) how well-reasoned his position is: the power of logical
inference, including (3) the use of data, i.e., the grounding of his speculation in reality;
(4) his conformity to certain moral standards, in part determined by the cultural tradition2;
and, (5) perhaps less directly but unequivocally, Sakharov is aware of the demand that he
follows in deed what he prescribes in word, which he does as a practicing human rights
advocate. With the exception of the final criterion, which goes beyond the limits of text
design to action, all of the above validity concerns are directly addressed and unified by
explicit reason giving in the global structure of his argument. Approaching Sakharov’s
argument as a multidimensional technique of justification, I will now discuss its function.
3. FUNCTION OF ARGUMENT
In my view, one of the most essential functions of argument (reason giving) in
Sakharov’s texts consists in demonstrating a model of practical reasoning that he deems
normative for democratic political deliberation. Its components include (1) wide
knowledge of the world, including history; (2) deep thinking, across various kinds of
rationality, speculative, technical, and practical, which Sakharov seems to regard as
continuous; (3) a refined sense of morality, holding some deontological values as
‘universal’; (4) care for the particular, for the ‘concrete’ value of unique people and
circumstances (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.77); (5) representative stance,
speaking on behalf of valued others; (6) enacting one’s principles in practical deeds. This
model of practical reason has two interesting features. First, it stands at the intersection of
deduction and induction, combining reasoning from the ‘universal’ premises to the
particular and from the novel particular to broader, intellective generalizations. Second,
Sakharov’s practical rationality is intrinsically public. It demands a reasoned extension of
2

Sakharov’s ethics is not unique. To a large extent, it represents the values of the Russian intelligentsia, a
distinct social group with deep roots in the nineteenth century Russian tradition of state opposition (Shatz,
1980; Shlapentokh, 1990). At the same time, Sakharov challenges their norms of passive, apolitical
resistance by initiating an open confrontation with the authorities (Chalidze, 1982).
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consciousness from the focus on private self-interest to the affirmation of public agency.
Through the six above operations, one transcends the limits of the private by relating it to
wider historical, political, and moral causes. In Section 1, I discussed how Sakharov lends
public stance to morality by embedding personal values in the logic of world-event
causality. In Section 2, I focused on how he extends his own ‘I’ by arguing for his
representative power. In its entirety, the structure of validity defense situates Sakharov’s
claims on two levels of contextualization, aligned along the axis of selfhood. On the one
hand, he lends meaning to his calls to action on the level of the global and the universal—
that of world events, rationality, and deontological ethics. On the other, he justifies them
on the level of the particular—that of concrete human beings, himself included, who,
through their personal quest, have come to an understanding of a world larger than their
own and who act upon this realization. The force of grounded rational conviction,
residing with an individual, subjugates the personal to the public.
Notably, Sakharov demonstrates public consciousness at work while he
simultaneously argues for it, as his final, culminating appeal across various statements.
Reasoning here has both a performative and logical function. In the given field-specific
practice of a dissident intellectual arguing against the establishment, Sakharov’s
technique can be interpreted as an argument by model (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969, pp. 362-364), where the end and the means of persuasion converge. He calls to
public agency by displaying his own way of gaining it, inviting adherence on rational
grounds, but also by imitation. While rationality commands agreement, imitation
involves free choice, and this Sakharov leaves to the reader. As long as he counts on
freedom, he has a reason to reason for the sheer sake of giving presence to what he
believes is right and exemplary—here, to the kind of public reasoning that he chooses as
his own modus cogitandi. Instead of naiveté, I interpret his argument style as revealing
distinct value commitments, consonant with his insistence on non-violent protest
(Sakharov, 1982, p.246). For all his emphasis on reasoning, he seems to put more faith in
the individual’s capacity to make choices than in the capacity of argument to convince.
For Sakharov, reasoned persuasion is indeed futile unless it takes hold of the interlocutor
from within the depth of her inner experience, as a result of free, conscientious reflection
on her place in the world rather than merely ‘force of the better argument’. By showing
his own reflection at work, he aims not so much to win over his opponents by means of
rational necessity as to create options—the modes of reasoning to adopt and the worlds to
inhabit.
From the perspective of its joint performative-justificatory function, Sakharov’s
deliberative style marries two traditions of theorizing practical reason, which Robert
Hariman terms ‘calculative’ and ‘performative’ (2003, pp.3-7). The former originates
with Aristotle’s phronesis; it seeks to formalize the principles of rational decision making
in practical circumstances. The latter Hariman associates with Cicero: it foregrounds the
unformalizable qualities of the person, phronimos, that since Aristotle has intrigued
theorists as a core factor in practical decision making—that elusive something ‘that can
only be captured through embodiment in the specific political actor’ (Hariman, 2003, p.
7; Self, 1979; Garver, 1994). By arguing simultaneously for and by means of public
practical reason, Sakharov-phronimos unites ‘rational calculation’ and ‘intelligible
performance’ in one rhetorical act.
The very duality of the tradition that Hariman sketches brings out a notorious
tension between the basic phenomena of reasoning and action, already implicit in
Aristotle’s conception of practical inference (MacIntyre, 1988; Walton, 1990, pp.8-16).
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Whereas Aristotle presumes that action automatically ensues from a rational sequitur,
without an intermediate step of ‘decision’ as a matter of willing, later theorists have come
to see the connection between thought and action as considerably more problematic
(Taylor, 1989). While a conceptual distinction between practical and speculative
rationality may promise a resolution in theory, in actual political deliberation the line
between the two gets blurred. Sakharov’s case well illustrates the point. In politics,
successful decision making depends on a comprehensive vision of world events, and the
latter takes a certain amount of speculation.
I think that Sakharov’s model of practical reasoning confirms the connection
between political action and specifically speculative thinking that has come into the
purview of Hannah Arendt (1977). Arendt perceives the disconnect between philosophy,
which searches for truth, and politics, which pursues action, to be so great that she
declares that philosophizing is unpolitical by nature. In his public statements, Sakharov
does not shun the role of a philosopher, in the tradition of Tolstoy’s moral
philosophizing. The power of Enlightenment rationality is part of his ‘philosophical
truth’—a universal value that he finds missing in the Kafkaesque world of Soviet
totalitarianism. Reflecting on philosophy and politics, Arendt comes to see a connection
between the two when she considers Socrates. This connection provides yet another way
to define the function of Sakharov’s argument. With regard to validity criteria of
speculative thinking, Arendt claims that rational (philosophical) truth has only one mode
of proof—embodying it in a live example. When Socrates refused to escape his death
sentence, he chose a way of defending his otherwise unpersuasive proposition ‘It is worse
to do wrong than to suffer wrong’, which he granted absolute truth. Sakharov with his
rational argument to the Soviet regime commits a similar act. By opposing the system, he
subjects himself and his family to repressions, and after 1985, to much social rejection
and misunderstanding. Yet he gives weight to his point—makes it a tangible worldly
thing that others can work with, integrated in the same political realm. According to
Arendt, in the experience of transforming ‘a theoretical or speculative statement into
exemplary truth’, a thinker becomes a political actor:
Where everybody lies about everything of importance, the truthteller, whether he knows it or not,
has begun to act; he, too, has engaged himself in political business, for, in the unlikely event that
he survives, he has made a start toward changing the world. (1954, p.251)
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